In the early 90’s, Austin would set out to perfect what would come to be known as the “Austin Model of Development,” which, for the most part, is just about bringing the state of Texas, through the university, into the local growth coalition as a leading actor (Tretter 2008, 75). The university created an internal institutional system that eased technological transfer and encouraged profitable commercialization of discoveries, which were firmly joined by a host of new state government initiatives. In turn, the state helped promote the University’s ability to function as a land developer so that it could serve as the state’s agent to develop central Texas (Tretter 2008).
Business elites saw it in their long-term interests to adopt some aspects of environmentalism to help transform Austin into the modern technopolis. The quickly recognized how their strong opposition to the Save Our Springs coalition worked against them, leading to a triumphant environmentalist friendly City Council in 1997: aka the “Green Council.” As a response, Austin’s local growth coalition began to set their sights on the revitalization of the downtown area and building up East Austin. As the downtown was already thoroughly developed, and East Austin was not situated above the Edwards Aquifer, nor in the habitats of local endangered species, this proposal was gladly accepted by the local environmentalists.
According to Tretter, the “sustainability fix” complements the “growth machine” theory, showing how sustainability can be turned into an engine and catalyst for growth (2016). In his analysis, Tretter focuses on how this shift to thinking in terms of ecologies, in tandem with a new strategy for a regime of social control shifted the burden of growth from non-humans to the homeless and communities of color (2016). These shifts came out of a backdoor political compromise between the City and the local business community and environmentalists (Walsh 2007). The community members of East Austin, who would be the most impacted by these changes, were notably excluded from this conversation. Thus, the “smart growth” plan of 1997 was less a grand victory of progressive political leadership than a shifting of the cost of development from non-humans to homeless people.
